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Regionalization and Labor Market Rigidities in Developing
Countries:
A CGE Analysis of UEMOA
Summary
In this study, we analyse the impact of the creation of a customs union among
UEMOA (Western African Economic and Monetary Union) countries, with a
special emphasis on the labour market structure. The implementation of the
customs union reform will translate in most of these countries, into a greater
openness, even with third party countries. This greater openness raises concerns
in these countries as regards its potential impact on welfare, production and
employment. In this study, in contrast to many other papers, we relax the
assumption of a perfect functioning of the labour market. We consider the
presence of a dualism in the labour market and the existence of a minimum wage
for the formal workers. We use a multi-country and multi-sectoral computable
general equilibrium model (CGE) to assess the impact of the reform. We find
that the presence of a minimum nominal wage for the formal workers may
significantly reduce the gains stemming from the customs union reform. Our
simulation results indicate that the costs induced by this rigidity may exceed 45%,
in some cases,  in terms of the reduction in the welfare gains obtained without
rigidity.2
1. Introduction
In this study we analyze the impact of the creation of regional trade agreement (RTA) in January
1994
4 among UEMOA
5 (Western African Economic and Monetary Union) countries, with a special
emphasis on the labour market structure.  The creation of this union occurs in an international
environment characterized by a proliferation in the formation of regional blocs.  Beyond the
pessimism that this new trend in international trade may induce among some economists
6, as regards
its impact on welfare, it is generally believed that such agreements can be beneficial, if they involve a
reduction in the protection against non-member countries.
7  The implementation of the UEMOA
agreement will translate into a tariff removal among its members and the application of common
external tariffs to third party countries. The latter will result in a greater openness for most countries
of the union. This greater openness raises many concerns in these countries, in relation to its
potential impact on welfare, production and employment.
The economic impact of the agreement in each country will depend, among other factors, on its
economic structure and, in particular, on the functioning of the labour market. Several studies, like
Milner and Wright (1998), Devarajan, Ghanem and Thierfelder (1997) and  Edwards and Edwards
(1994), among others, have shown that functioning of the labour market may affect the gains
resulting from a trade liberalization reform.  In fact, the changes in relative prices, induced by the
reduction in the protection afforded to some sectors, induce a factor reallocation in the economy.
Efficiency gains from this reallocation depend, among other things, on wage flexibility in the labour
market.  Most of the previous studies, which analyzed the impact of RTAs in different regions of the
world, gave little attention to the labour market structure, Decaluwé, Dissou and Patry (1998),
Harrisson and al. (1997) and DeRosa (1995), among others. They made the assumption of a perfect
labour market functioning. If this assumption is suitable for developed countries, it is less
appropriate for developing countries.  Many studies, like Agenor and Aizenman (1999), Fortin et al.
                                                
4 The full implementation of the treaty has been effective since January 2000.
5 UEMOA was first composed by Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, and was
later joined by Guinée Bissau.
6 Perroni and Whalley (2000) and Winters (1996) provide some interesting reviews on this theme.
7 This idea is defended by the proponents of the "open regionalism" thesis. See Wei and Frankel (1998) for
details on this notion.3
(1997), Riveros (1994) and Rosenzweig (1988), among others, have reported the presence of
numerous distortions and of a dualism on the labour market in developing countries. This dualism
stems from the existence of two types of labour, namely the formal and informal workers. The
former receives higher income and welfare benefits, as opposed to the latter. Moreover, the
downward rigidity of formal workers’ wage is the most encountered form of labour market
distortion in developing countries. This exogenous
8 rigidity often originates from government laws
or from the negotiation power of unions, which seek to insure a minimum income to their members.
The economic impacts of a minimum wage imposed for a particular category of labour, in a partial
equilibrium framework, are well documented in the economic literature. With such a distortion, the
level of employment being always determined by the firms, a quantity adjustment may occur
following a change in relative prices. If the rationed formal workers are able to move to the non-
regulated market, the reduction in their demand will entail greater competition between the newly
unemployed formal workers and the informal workers.  Consequently, a downward pressure will be
exerted on the wage of informal labour. This phenomenon may negatively affect the size of the gains
following a trade liberalization reform. The plausibility of this phenomenon is even higher when the
workers protected by the minimum wage legislation are mainly employed in the most protected
sectors before the reform. Moreover, this adjustment becomes more painful when protected sectors
employ less informal workers.  Taking into account the labour market structure is thus desirable in
the evaluation of the real impacts of a customs union reform.
This aspect is very relevant in the case of UEMOA countries, where a recent study by Rama (1998)
shows that the downward rigidity of the nominal wage in the "CFA countries
9" has contributed to
the overvaluation of their currency, recently devaluated by 100% in 1994. To our knowledge, Park
(1995) presents the only regional integration model, involving developing countries, which departs
from the assumption of perfect functioning of the labour market.
The objective of this study is to assess the impact of the reform on the UEMOA members, in the
presence of distortions in the labour market. We use a multi-country and multi-sector computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the impact of the reform with and without these
                                                
8 That is, not explained by the model, as opposed to an endogenous rigidity, as in efficiency wages models.4
distortions. We consider the case of a downward rigidity of formal workers' nominal wage.  We are
thus able to evaluate the welfare cost of these distortions in each country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model, then, in the
third section,  we discuss the data,  the calibration procedures and the numerical resolution.  The
simulation results are discussed in the fourth section, followed by our conclusions in the last section.
2. The Model
We present in this section a thumbnail sketch of the model. Readers interested in fuller details may
find the complete listing of equations, variables and parameters in Appendix 2. We develop a static,
multi-sector and multi-country, general equilibrium model in the same tradition as De Melo and Tarr
(1992). Our model features a disaggregation of the production and consumption sectors in each
country as well as the flows of bilateral trade among them. A distinctive characteristic of this model
from most of previous multi-country general equilibrium models is the functioning of the labour
market. Two types of workers (formal and informal) are considered and the nominal wage of the
former is downward rigid.
2.1 Production
Eighteen productive sectors are identified in each of the seven countries of the union
10. In contrast
to Decaluwé, Dissou and Patry (1998), we use the same sectoral disaggregation of the productive
sectors in all countries. Firms have access to constant returns to scale technology. Like many general
equilibrium models, the present one breaks down the production structure into a sequential decision
process, which offers some interesting substitution possibilities among factors. This sequential
structure is depicted by nested production functions. The composite output is a Cobb-Douglas
function of value-added and the aggregate of material inputs. Value-added is obtained by combining
capital and the aggregate input of labour with a constant elasticity of substitution function (CES).
The aggregate input of labour is Cobb-Douglas function of the two types of labour categories
11.
                                                                                                                                                             
9 CFA countries are those which use a common currency, F CFA, which is pegged to the French Franc.
10 See Appendix 1 for the list of sectors.
11 When they are simultaneously used in the sector.5
Finally, the aggregate of material inputs is obtained with a Leontief technology. All firms evolve in a
competitive environment and maximize profits to determine output supply and factor demands.
2.2 Demand
In each country, total domestic demand of each commodity is the sum of the demands for
household and government’s uses and, the demands for investment and intermediate consumption
uses. In each country, the preferences of the representative household are represented by a Stone-
Geary utility function (or Linear Expenditure System). The household receives income from primary
factors' remuneration, transfers from the government and from the rest of the world. A fix portion
of its income is used to pay income taxes to the government and its savings are a linear function of
its disposable income.
Government's expenditures for each good are fixed in real terms.  Its other expenses consist of
transfers to households and net transfers to the rest of the world. Its income comes from taxes on
international trade (mainly on imports) and taxes on the remuneration of primary factors. Taxes on
imports consist of tariffs and other taxes such as value-added tax 
12.
2.3 Trade
Referring to Armington (1969), domestic and foreign goods are distinguished by their origins. This
specification has the advantage to accommodate both exports and imports of the same commodity
(crosshauling). On the demand side, regional imports from other UEMOA countries are
distinguished from imports from the rest of the world. Moreover imports from different countries of
the Union are imperfect substitutes. A three-level nested CES function allows us to capture the
differentiation between imports and domestic commodities. At the first level, domestic absorption
(sum of the demands for final and intermediates uses) is a CES function of domestically produced
goods and the aggregate of imports.  The latter is obtained by combining, with a CES function at the
second level, the aggregate of regional imports and the imports from the rest of the world. Finally,
the aggregate of regional imports is another CES function of imports from different UEMOA6
countries. This nested structure allows the representative agent’s decision to take place in the form of
a multi-step budgeting. A cost-minimization rule allows the determination of the optimal level of
each component of the domestic absorption.
Like imports, exports are differentiated according to their destination. Three nested constant
elasticity of transformation (CET) functions allow us to capture the imperfect substitution between
the different components of the representative firm’s supply in each sector. A revenue maximization
principle allows firms to allocate the supply of the aggregate output among its various components.
While a small country assumption is used to characterize each country’s relationship with the rest of
the world, implying fixed world import and export prices, the prices of bilaterally traded goods are
fully endogenous. They are determined by the market clearing conditions. Finally, the total current
account balance for each country is the sum of its balance with the rest of the world and its regional
balance.  The latter is the sum of balances with each Union's partner.
2.4 Labour market
Each labour category can move freely among sectors in a country, while it is immobile between
countries. When the firm’s technology allows the simultaneous use of the two types of labour, it can
substitute one type of labour for the other according to Cobb-Douglas technology. Due to
government legislation, the nominal wage of formal worker is downward rigid. We suppose that the
employment level is always determined by firms, i.e. firms are always on their labour demand curve.
When the formal workers’ minimum wage is binding, following a change in the relative prices, firms
are compelled to lay off some of these workers, since this is the only choice remaining to them. Note
that these workers are still willing to work on the ongoing wage on the formal labour market. We
assume that the rationed workers have no choice but to compete for employment in the informal
labour market. This will translate into a downward pressure on the informal wage. In these
conditions, the total labour supply being fixed, the supply of informal labour is endogenous. Its
quantity is equal to the sum of the base-run quantity of informal workers and the excess supply of
formal workers. In this paper, we depart from many other studies, which analyzed the impacts of
                                                                                                                                                             
12 UEMOA countries use the destination principle in the application of the value-added tax. Imports are
subject to this tax like domestically produced goods, while exports are exempted.7
wage rigidity in CGE models.  Instead of simply fixing the level of the formal wage at its minimum
value, we allow it to vary freely above its floor level. We are then able to model a truly downward
rigidity of the formal workers’ wage. Below, further indications, on the way we formalize this aspect
in this model, are provided.
2.5 Equilibrium Conditions.
The general equilibrium of this model is represented by a static allocation of goods and factors
supported by a vector of prices such that the following conditions are satisfied:
•   Equilibrium in the domestic good's market in every country.
•   Equilibrium between import demand and export supply in the bilateral trade of each
good.
•   Balance of payments equilibrium.
•   Equilibrium in the labour market.
Referring to the latter equilibrium condition, some additional explanations are required in relation to
the formal labour market. We specify the wage inequality condition on the formal labour market and
impose an orthogonality condition between the excess supply of formal workers and the difference
between the current and minimum formal wages. Referring to Drèze (1975), this orthogonality
condition is a required equilibrium condition in the presence of price rigidity. Thus, if the minimum
wage is binding, the rationing will be strictly positive, while it is equal to zero in the other case
13.
Finally, on the informal market, wage adjusts to achieve equilibrium between demand and supply of
this factor.
2.6 Closure
The model's numéraire is the nominal exchange rate with the rest of the world or, in other words,
the rest of the world's imports price index. We distinguish three closures rules in the model.  The
first closure rule is relative to the government's account.  We fix the receipts from indirect taxation at
their base-run values and use a new uniform domestic tax as a policy instrument. After a shock the
new domestic tax, which replaces the old one, is set at a value such as to achieve the required
                                                
13 Park (1995) has also used this formalisation in the specification of his analytical model.8
constraint.  The second closure pertains to the macroeconomic equilibrium condition between
investment expenditures and savings. The model is savings-driven in the sense that investment
expenditures are endogenous and determined by the amount of total available savings. The latter is
equal to the sum of the savings of households, firms, government and foreign agents. Note that total
foreign savings in each country is the sum of the rest of the word's savings and the regional savings.
Finally, the last closure deals with the external account in each country.  We assume that each
country's total current account is equal to its total foreign savings, which we maintain fixed.  This
equilibrium condition is achieved by an adjustment of the real exchange rate.
3. Data, calibration and numerical resolution
We calibrate the model on the data of the year 1996, which is the most recent year for which detailed
information on national accounts is available for all UEMOA countries.  We built a social accounting
matrix (SAM) for each UEMOA member, using input-output tables and  trade data for each country.
Information on government's financial operations and on the balance of payments allows us to
complete the construction of the SAM.  Tables 1 and 2 present each country's characteristics,
according to their respective SAM.
Using these data and other behavior parameters found in the literature, we calibrated all other
parameters, such as tax rates and distribution parameters in various functions in order to replicate the
base data. The calibration process and the numerical resolution of the model follow classic
procedures used in most static CGE models.  Table 3 presents some of the critical parameters used
in the model. We solve the model numerically with the software GAMS (General Algebraic
Modelling Systems) and the solver Conopt.
Table 1: GDP Structure (in %) of UEMOA countries, 1996
Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Private Consumption 82.92 85.14 68.23 83.11 80.03 84.50 82.48
Public Consumption 10.19 11.68 12.58 17.16 17.17 11.67 13.05
Investment 18.52 27.40 13.26 25.78 11.99 17.00 13.01
Exports 28.26 13.98 46.63 20.49 18.96 38.17 31.61
Imports 34.09 33.21 35.41 39.85 25.76 43.07 40.759
Table 2: Trade pattern (in %) of UEMOA countries, 1996
Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Regional Exports 2.20  1.03  9.19  1.18  0.29  7.04  2.83
Exports to ROW 97.08 98.97 90.81 98.82 99.71 92.96 97.17
Regional Imports  7.07 18.09 1.34 24.45 13.07  2.22 6.79
Imports from ROW 92.93 81.91 98.66 75.55 86.93 97.78 93.21
Table 3: Substitution Elasticities for some functions
CES CES (Armington) CET (supply)
1st level 2nd level 3rd level 1st level 2nd level 3rd level
Food crops 0.45 1.5 3 3 1.5 3 3
I n d u s t r i a l  a g r i c u l t u r e 0 . 4 5 1 . 533 1 . 533
L i v e s t o c k 0 . 4 5 1 . 533 1 . 533
Fishing and forestry 0.45 1.5 3 3 1.5 3 3
Extractive industry 0.6 1.5 3 3 1.5 3 3
F o o d  i n d u s t r y 1 . 5244244
T e x t i l e  i n d u s t r y 1 . 5244244
C h e m i c a l  i n d u s t r y 1 . 5244244
M e t a l  i n d u s t r y 1 . 5244244
O t h e r  i n d u s t r y 1 . 5244244
Utilities 1.5244244
Construction 0.95 1.5 3 3 1.5 3 3
T r a n s p o r t ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n 2 1 . 533 1 . 533
F i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s 2244244
R e a l  e s t a t e  s e r v i c e s 2244244
H o t e l s ,  b a r s ,  r e s t . ,  c o m m e r c e2244244
O t h e r  s e r v i c e s 2244244
P u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 2------
4. Simulations
We evaluate the impact of the customs union reform in two main simulations, where we consider
different functioning of the labour market.  In the first one, we assume that the labour market
functions perfectly with no distortions. Wages adjust to achieve equilibrium between demand and
supply for all labour categories. In the second simulation, we assume a downward rigidity of the
formal worker’s nominal wage. In both simulations, the reform consists of the complete elimination
of all tariffs on regional imports and the application of common external tariffs for imports from
non-members. These common external tariffs have been set by a UEMOA expert's commission.10
Non-regional import goods are classified in four categories 0, I, II and III on which tariff rates of 0,
5, 10 and 20 %, are respectively applied. Given these rates and the product classification, we
compute the average nominal tariff rate pertaining to each of the eighteen goods distinguished in the
model. Table 4 presents these common external tariffs
14.
In order to take into consideration the exemptions on import duties granted to some agents in all
UEMOA countries, we have appropriately scaled down these common external tariffs by using the
average exemption rate on imports as provided in Duhamel and Gosset-Grainville (1996). As shown
in Table 5, the application of common external tariffs translates into a reduction in trade barriers on
non-regional imports, in all UEMOA countries. Moreover, as can be seen from Table 5, the customs
union reform translates into a liberalization of total imports, and it allows each Union's member to
get a better access to the regional export market.
For a better understanding of the difference between the results of the two main scenarios, we focus
our discussions on the basic mechanisms at stake in the first one and explain, for the second
simulation, the reasons of the observed changes. We pay particular attention to the adjustments in
the labour market.  For space restraints, we do not discuss the sectoral results; we mainly concentrate
on aggregated results
15, which are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 4: Common external tariffs in UEMOA countries in %
Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Food crops 8.6 11.4 7.6 8.7 11.0 8.6 6.2
Ind. agriculture 5.0 5.2 7.8 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.6
Livestock 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.0 7.0 5.6 6.2
Fish.and for. 20.0 10.1 10.1 10.1 11.5 16.3 10.0
Extr. industry 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Food industry 13.8 12.6 12.1 14.7 15.5 13.6 16.4
Textile industry 18.7 19.2 16.0 19.0 18.6 17.3 18.9
Chem. industry 7.9 5.8 5.7 5.9 6.1 7.8 5.8
Metal industry 11.3 11.0 11.5 9.3 11.3 12.9 11.6
Other industry 13.4 13.6 12.0 12.9 13.7 12.0 11.9
Public utilities 8.6 8.1 9.4 8.7 9.2 10.0 10.0
                                                
14 Differences in imports’ composition explain the variation in the rate applied to the same commodity across
countries.
15 Interested readers may obtain sectoral results from the authors.11
Table 5: Average total import tax rate, in %, before and after the reform.
Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Before, on all imports 18.58 20.12 15.37 19.54 11.82 18.36 14.87
After, on all imports 17.30 8.99 9.03 17.73 7.11 7.26 8.60
Before, on regional imports 21.58 27.94 3.92 33.80 15.80 21.93 16.67
After, on regional imports 14.94 11.12 2.10 26.20 6.76 21.74 4.64
Before, on imports from ROW 18.35 18.39 15.52 14.93 11.22 18.28 14.74
After, on imports from ROW 17.48 8.52 9.12 14.98 7.16 6.93 8.89
4.1 Simulation 1: Customs union reform without downward rigidity of the
nominal wage of formal workers
The reform's implementation translates into three direct impacts in each country: i) complete
elimination of tariff barriers on regional imports; ii) reduction in nominal protection on non-regional
imports; and iii) greater access to the regional market. Trade barriers being eliminated or reduced,
total imports raise with some trade diversion effect though, in favor of regional imports, in all
countries, except Mali and Senegal. Increased imports from the region or from the rest of the world
put a downward pressure on domestic prices, which decrease in all countries, except Ivory Coast and
Togo. In these two countries, the new uniform tax on domestic goods set to compensate for the
drop in tariff revenue, neutralize the downward impact of increased imports on domestic prices.
Since total foreign savings are exogenous in each country, total exports must increase by the same
amount as total imports. This increase is achieved by a simultaneous rise in regional and non-regional
exports, in different proportion depending on the trade structure of each country. The complete
elimination of tariffs on regional imports in the Union promotes regional exports in every country.
However, the rise in regional exports is insufficient to satisfy the required increase in total exports,
hence, exports to the rest of the world have to rise. In most countries, this increase is brought by the
depreciation of the real exchange rate. The largest depreciation is observed in Burkina Faso (5.94%),
while Ivory Coast and Togo experience an appreciation, resulting from higher prices for domestically
produced goods. Note that, notwithstanding the real exchange rate appreciation, exports to the rest
of the world rise in both countries; this result is not counter-intuitive though. In fact, given the
nested structure of firm supply by destination, total export supply may increase in spite of the drop
in the price of exports relative to the domestic price, if the composite output supply increases.12
Table 6: Aggregate impact of customs union reform in UEMOA countries without wage rigidity
Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Prices (% change from benchmark)
Real exchange rate16 0.62 5.94 -5.55 1.29 0.20 4.66 -0.24
Consumer price index -0.64 -6.95 2.54 -2.38 -0.92 -5.79 -1.08
Domestic price index -0.57 -5.92 5.17 -1.25 -0.19 -4.40 0.28
Nominal wage index 0.84 -6.54 16.74 0.33 1.13 -3.88 3.49
Real wage, formal labour 1.53 -0.36 17.29 -0.38 2.01 1.98 7.02
Real wage, informal labour 1.18 1.68 3.29 5.96 2.32 2.34 1.05
Nominal wage, formal labour 0.89 -7.29 20.28 -2.75 1.08 -3.93 5.86
Nominal wage, informal labour 0.54 -5.39 5.91 3.44 1.38 -3.59 -0.04
Trade (%change from benchmark)
Total exports 1.50 7.21 40.83 1.59 8.86 7.44 15.64
Regional exports 13.13 21.76 12.25 15.46 13.37 21.42 7.51
Exports to ROW 1.24 7.06 43.71 1.43 8.85 6.38 15.87
Total imports 1.24 3.04 53.92 0.82 6.52 6.59 12.24
Regional imports 6.18 20.80 62.79 -0.12 22.67 -24.78 51.48
Imports from ROW 0.87 -0.89 53.80 1.13 4.09 7.31 9.38
Current Account Balance (% change from benchmark GDP)
Regional balance 0.06 1.14 -0.21 -0.05 0.73 -0.75 1.28
ROW balance -0.06 -1.14 0.21 0.05 -0.73 0.75 -1.28
Total balance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Households (% change from benchmark)
Equivalent variation (% of GDP) -0.09 0.19 6.95 1.01 0.53 0.57 2.15
Household disposable income -0.15 -6.25 10.82 -0.16 -0.38 -5.53 1.41
Fiscal revenue (%change from benchmark)
Total fiscal revenue -0.17 -2.03 1.95 -1.12 -0.03 -1.67 0.1
Indirect tax revenue -0.38 -7.17 8.85 -0.28 -0.59 -5.98 0.41
Import tax revenue -6.14 -52.27 -27.89 -10.2 -36.15 -56.35 -33.54
Uniform tax rate on domestic
goods (%)
1.35 4.37 5.67 1.94 1.82 4.45 3.89
Besides, the simultaneous change in the domestic and regional export prices affects firms’ labour
demand via the price of value-added. The nominal wage index increases in all countries, except for
Burkina Faso and Senegal, where it falls by 6.54% and 3.88%, respectively. This change is the result
of the simultaneous variation of the nominal wages of formal and informal workers.  Following the
reform, the nominal wage of formal workers falls in Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal, and increases in
all other countries. The nominal wage of informal workers decreases in Burkina Faso, Senegal and
Togo and raises in the others. Though nominal wage falls in some countries, real wages (in terms of
consumer price index) increase in all countries, except for formal workers in Burkina and Mali.  This13
latter result stems from the significant reduction in the consumer price index.  This index falls in
every country, except for Ivory Coast, where it increases by 2.54%. In this country, the increase in
domestic prices outweighs the reduction in the price of import goods.   In almost every country
(except Benin), households benefit from the fall in consumer prices and enjoy a higher welfare, as
reported in Table 6 by the equivalent variation expressed in percentage of base-run GDP.
4.2 Simulations 2: Customs union reform in the presence of a downward
rigidity of the nominal wage of formal workers
In this simulation, we relax the assumption of perfect flexibility of the nominal wage of formal
workers.  We introduce a downward rigidity on the nominal wage for these workers and set a floor at
the wage level observed in the benchmark data. The traditional adjustments following a trade
liberalization and a greater access to regional markets are also observed in the present scenario. In
comparison to the first scenario where wages are flexible, the rigidity will be restrictive in Burkina,
Mali and Senegal only, where the formal nominal wage fell. Therefore the results will significantly
differ from the ones obtained in the previous simulation in these three countries only. Table 7
reports the results of this simulation.
In these countries, firms must ration formal workers because the minimum nominal wage is binding.
The surplus of formal workers varies from 2.50 % in Mali to 5.55 % in Burkina Faso. The spillover
of rationed formal to the informal labour market increases labour supply and puts a downward
pressure on their nominal wage. The latter decreases more or increases less, depending on the
country, in comparison to the first simulation. An efficiency loss follows because firms are
constrained to use a non-optimal quantity of formal workers. They would have employed more
workers in perfect labour market environment.
                                                                                                                                                             
16 An increase in the real exchange rate is equivalent to a depreciation.14
Table 7: Aggregate impact of customs union reform in UEMOA countries with wage rigidity
Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Prices (% change from benchmark)
Real exchange rate 0.62 5.25 -5.55 1.04 0.20 4.31 -0.24
Consumer price index -0.64 -6.40 2.54 -2.19 -0.92 -5.52 -1.08
Domestic price index -0.57 -5.22 5.17 -1.00 -0.19 -4.03 0.28
Nominal wage index 0.83 -3.67 16.73 1.04 1.13 -1.85 3.49
Real wage, formal labour 1.53 6.84 17.29 2.24 2.01 5.84 7.01
Real wage, informal labour 1.18 -2.93 3.29 4.38 2.32 -8.03 1.04
Nominal wage, formal labour 0.88 0 20 0 1 0 5.86
Nominal wage, informal labour 0.54 -9.15 5.91 2.09 1.38 -13.11 -0.04
Trade (% change from benchmark)
Total exports 1.50 6.59 40.83 1.51 8.86 6.38 15.63
Regional exports 13.15 21.17 12.39 15.27 13.46 20.69 7.43
Exports to ROW 1.24 6.44 43.70 1.35 8.85 5.30 15.87
Total imports 1.25 2.77 53.92 0.78 6.52 5.66 12.23
Regional imports 5.97 21.05 61.87 -0.06 22.64 -25.18 51.42
Imports from ROW 0.89 -1.26 53.81 1.05 4.10 6.36 9.38
Current Account Balance (% change from benchmark GDP)
Regional balance 0.06 1.16 -0.22 -0.04 0.73 -0.74 1.28
ROW balance -0.06 -1.16 0.22 0.04 -0.73 0.74 -1.28
Total balance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Households (% change from benchmark)
Equivalent variation (% of GDP) -0.09 0.13 6.95 1.01 0.53 0.30 2.15
Excess supply of formal  workers 0 5.55 0 2.50 0 4.37 0
Household disposable income -0.16 -5.92 10.82 -0.16 -0.38 -5.86 1.4
Fiscal revenue (% change from benchmark)
Total fiscal revenue -0.17 -1.88 1.95 -0.75 -0.03 -1.76 0.1
Indirect tax revenue -0.38 -6.89 8.85 -0.27 -0.59 -6.31 0.41
Import tax revenue -6.14 -52.35 -27.88 -10.2 -36.15 -56.75 -33.55
 Uniform tax rate on domestic
goods (%)
1.35 4.37 5.67 1.94 1.82 4.50 3.89
Consequently, all three countries experience smaller welfare gains compared to the situation where
wages are perfectly flexible. The cost in terms of welfare of the rigidity is high and even reaches 47%
in Senegal where the equivalent variation falls from 0.57 to 0.30.15
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to verify the result sensibility to the parameters used, we run four other scenarios in which
we use lower and higher values for some key behavioral parameters. We respectively reduced
substitution elasticities at different level for the nested Armington function by 25% and raised by
50%. Results from these simulations (see Tables 8 and 9) confirm the qualitative results obtained in
the previous simulations with, however, a magnitude that varies depending on the elasticities' value.
More precisely, the higher the Armington elasticities are, the greater the excess of rationed workers
on the formal market.  Furthermore, the welfare loss due to the rigidity on the labour market
increases with higher elasticity values in most countries. In Senegal, for instance, the loss reaches
60% in the case of highest elasticities of substitution.
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis of customs union reform in UEMOA countries without wage
rigidity (% change from benchmark)
Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Real exchange rate (low17) 0.63 5.6 -5.93 1.12 -0.24 4.03 -0.69
Real exchange rate (high18) 0.58 6.39 -4.87 1.46 0.8 5.52 0.38
Domestic price index (low) -0.59 -5.58 5.56 -1.08 0.24 -3.68 0.73
Domestic price index (high) -0.52 -6.36 4.48 -1.42 -0.79 -5.37 -0.35
Nom. wage, formal (low) 0.91 -6.97 19.4 -2.3 1.44 -3.43 5.93
Nom. wage, formal (high) 0.86 -7.64 22.03 -3.26 0.54 -4.57 5.96
Nom. wage, informal (low) 0.43 -5.48 6.16 3.18 1.59 -3.44 0.25
Nom. wage, informal (high) 0.73 -5.02 5.54 3.94 1.17 -3.79 -0.35
Total exports (low) 1.44 6.75 35.69 1.42 8.04 6.56 13.17
Total exports (high) 1.59 7.87 50.75 1.82 10.03 8.69 19.95
Total imports (low) 1.19 2.84 47.13 0.73 5.92 5.82 10.31
Total imports (high) 1.32 3.31 67.02 0.94 7.38 7.7 15.61
Total fiscal revenue (low) -0.2 -1.97 1.95 -1.02 0.18 -1.51 0.17
Total fiscal revenue(high) -0.13 -2.09 1.93 -1.23 -0.31 -1.88 0.04
Equivalent variation % (low) -0.08 0.11 6.3 0.95 0.53 0.56 1.99
Equivalent variation %(high) -0.1 0.34 8.17 1.13 0.53 0.59 2.48
                                                
17 Low: Base Armington elasticities are reduced by 25%.
18 High: Base Armington elasticities are increased by 50%.16
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis of customs union reform in UEMOA countries with wage rigidity
(% change from benchmark)
Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Real exchange rate (low) 0.63 4.9 -5.93 0.9 -0.24 3.71 -0.69
Real exchange rate (high) 0.58 5.72 -4.87 1.19 0.8 5.14 0.38
Domestic price index (low) -0.59 -4.88 5.56 -0.86 0.24 -3.34 0.73
Domestic price index (high) -0.52 -5.68 4.48 -1.16 -0.79 -4.97 -0.35
Nom. wage, formal (low) 0.91 0 19.39 0 1.44 0 5.93
Nom. wage, formal (high) 0.86 0 22.03 0 0.54 0 5.96
Nom. wage, informal (low) 0.43 -9.04 6.16 2.07 1.59 -11.81 0.25
Nom. wage, informal (high) 0.73 -9.02 5.54 2.27 1.17 -14.8 -0.36
Total exports (low) 1.44 6.1 35.68 1.34 8.04 5.7 13.17
Total exports (high) 1.59 7.29 50.75 1.74 10.03 7.33 19.95
Total imports (low) 1.19 2.57 47.13 0.69 5.92 5.05 10.31
Total imports (high) 1.32 3.07 67.03 0.9 7.38 6.5 15.61
Total fiscal revenue (low) -0.2 -1.82 1.95 -0.7 0.18 -1.59 0.17
Total fiscal revenue (high) -0.13 -1.95 1.93 -0.79 -0.31 -2 0.04
Equivalent variation (low) -0.08 0.06 6.29 0.95 0.53 0.34 1.99
Equivalent variation (high) -0.1 0.28 8.17 1.12 0.53 0.24 2.47
Formal surplus (low) 0 5.25 0 2.05 0 3.76 0
Formal surplus (high) 0 5.91 0 3.03 0 5.22 0
5. Conclusion
The presence of a dualism in the labour market and the existence of an exogenous downward rigidity
of the wage of some labour categories are some characteristics, peculiar to many developing
countries, reported by many studies on the functioning of the labour market. These characteristics
have frequently been identified as obstacles to economic growth in these countries. In this paper, we
studied the impacts of the customs union implementation among UEMOA countries taking into
account the above-mentioned characteristics.  Using a static, multi-sectoral and multi-country CGE
model, we found that the presence of a minimum nominal wage for the formal workers may
significantly reduce the gains stemming from the customs union reform. Without a downward
rigidity of formal workers’ wage, our simulation results show the reform is welfare improving in all
member-countries, except Benin, which experiences a small loss. The introduction of a downward
rigidity in the formal workers’ nominal wage reduces the welfare gains experienced in the absence of
that distortion. Our results indicate that the reduction in the welfare gains may exceed 45% in some
cases, as in Senegal.17
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Appendix 1: List of sectors
1.  Food crops
2.  Industrial agriculture
3.  Livestock
4.  Fishing and forestry
5.  Extractive industry
6.  Food industry
7.  Textile industry
8.  Chemical industry




13. Transport and communication
14. Financial services
15. Real estate services
16. Hotels, bars, rest. and commerce
17. Other services
18. Public administration20
Appendix 2 : Variables, parameters and equations
Superscripts f, and h refer countries
Subscripts i or j refer to goods or commodities
Subscript LC refers to labour categories
Variables
f
i C Household consumption (volume) of good i
f
i Cmin   Minimal household consumption
f CM Total household’s consumption expenditures
f CG Total value of government consumption
f DG Total value of government expenditures
f
i DINT Intermediate demand for good i
f
i DINV Investment demand for good i
f DIRTAX Total direct taxes
f
i DSTK Stocks variation (exogenous)
f ESAV Firms’ savings
fh
i EXP   Exports of good i from country f to country h
f
i Exrdm   Exports of good i from country f to the rest of the world
f
i EXREG   Exports of good i from country f to the region
f
i EXT   Total country f ‘s exports of good i
f FSAV  Foreign  savings
f
i G Government consumption of good i
f GSAV Government savings
f HSAV Households savings
f INDTAX Total indirect taxes
f
i Int Intermediate composite volume for sector i
f
i K Demand for capital of sector i (exogenous)
f
LCi LD Demand for labour for each category, by sector i
f
LC LCS Labour supply by category
f
infor LCS0 Informal labour supply in the benchmark data
f
i LDT  Aggregate  labour21
fh
i MP Imports of good i by country f from country h
f
i Mrdm Imports of good i by country f from the rest of the world
f
i Mreg   Imports of good i by country f from the region
f
i MT Total imports of good i by country f
f
i P   Price of composite output i
f
i Pc   Consumer price of good i
f
i Pd   Domestic price of good i
fh
i Pexp   Producer’s export price of good i from country f to country h (net of tax)
f
i Pexrdm Producer’s export price of good i from country f to the rest of the world (net of tax)
f
i Pexreg   Producer’s export price of good i from country f to the region (net of tax)
f
i Pext   Producer’s total export price of good i in country f (net of tax)
f
i Pint   Composite price of intermediate consumption
fh
i Pmp   Import price of good i in country f from country h (including taxes)
f
i Pmrdm   Import price of good i in country f from the rest of the world (including taxes)
f
i Pmreg   Import price of good i in country f from the regional (including taxes)
f
i Pmt   Total import price of good i in country f (including taxes)
fh PSAV Current account balance of country f with country h
f
i Pva Value-added price
fh
i Pwexp   FOB price of exports of good i from f to h
fh
i Pwmp   World price of imports by country f  from country h
f
i Pwmrdm   World price of imports by f from the rest of the world
f RDMSAV   Current account balance with the rest of the world
f REGSAV   Regional current account balance
f RKE   Firms' capital income
f RKM   Households' capital income
f
i RRK   Sectoral capital remuneration
f TOTSAV  Total  savings
f
i VA   Value added (volume)
f
LCI WC Nominal wage rate by labour category
f
i WT   Index of nominal wage in sector i
f
i XDD   Demand for domestic good i
f
i XS   Firm’s composite output in sector i
f
i XSD   Supply of domestic good in sector i22
f
i XT   Domestic absorption of commodity i
f YDM   Households' disposable income
f YG  Government  income
f YL   Households' labour income
f YM   Households' total factor income
f ER   Nominal exchange rate
f U Excess supply of formal workers
f TRGE Government transfers to firms (exogenous)
f TRGM Government transfers to households (exogenous)
f TRGROW Government transfers to the rest of the world (exogenous)
f TROWM Rest of the world transfers to households (exogenous)
Parameters
f
i AD   Shift parameter in the composite output function
f
ij a  Input-output  coefficient
f
i α   Share parameter in the composite output function
f
i AM1   Shift parameter in the Armington function (first level)
f
i AM2   Shift parameter in the Armington function (second level)
f
i AM3   Shift parameter in the Armington function (third level)
f
i AP   Shift parameter in the added value function
f
i AW   Shift parameter in the labour aggregation function
f
i AX1   Shift parameter in the CET function (first level)
f
i AX2 Shift parameter in the CET function (second level)
f
i AX3   Shift parameter in the CET function (third level)
f
Ei β   Share of good i in total investment expenditures
f
LESi β   Marginal budget share in the LES function
f
i 1 δ Share parameter in the Armington function (first level)
f
i 2 δ Share parameter in the Armington function (second level)
f
i 3 δ Share parameter in the Armington function (third level)
f
i 1 γ Share parameter in the CET function (first level)
f
i 2 γ Share parameter in the CET function (second level)
f
i 3 γ Share parameter in the CET function (third level)23
f λ   Share of total capital income to households
f mps   Marginal propensity to save
f
LCi µ Share of each labour category in sectoral total labour income
f
M i 1 ρ Elasticity parameter in the CES function (first level)
f
M i 2 ρ Elasticity parameter in the CES function (second level)
f
M i 3 ρ Elasticity parameter in the CES function (third level)
f
P i ρ Elasticity parameter in the added value function
f
X i 1 ρ Elasticity parameter in the CET function (first level)
f
X i 2 ρ Elasticity parameter in the CET function (second level)
f
X i 3 ρ Elasticity parameter in the CET function (third level)
f
M i 1 σ Substitution elasticity for the CES function (first level)
f
M i 2 σ Substitution elasticity for the CES function (second level)
f
M i 3 σ Substitution elasticity for the CES function (third level)
f
P i 3 σ Substitution elasticity for the added value function
f
X i 1 σ Substitution elasticity for the CET function (first level)
f
X i 2 σ Substitution elasticity for the CET function (second level)
f
X i 3 σ Substitution elasticity for the CET function (third level)
f SO Intercept in the households saving function
fh
i mp τ   Duty rate on imports of country f from country h
f
i mrdm τ Duty rate1 on imports from the rest of the world
fh
i texp Tax rate on exports of country f to country h
f
i texrdm Tax rate on exports to the rest of the world
f
i θ Share parameter in the added value function
f
i tmrdm Average rate (all taxes) on imports from the rest of the world
f
i TP Production tax rate
fh
i txmp Other taxes' rate on imports of country f from country h
f
i txmrdm Other taxes' rate on imports country f from the rest of the world
f
E ty Firms’ income tax rate
f
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